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Abstract – Current firewalls and intrusion
detection systems are generally designed to
protect a single gateway in order to provide
protection for machines residing behind the
gateway on an internal network. When
considering a network incorporating multiple
gateways across a range of IP addresses exposed
to the Internet, interesting data can be gathered
with regard to the types of scans occurring
across these gateways from the outside. The
validity of using a central server to amalgamate,
reduce and analyse the log files of each gateway
is investigated in order to examine the activities
of the scans across multiple gateways and port
numbers. The results from this analysis can
then be used to act against an attack through
heuristic driven rule creation.
INTRODUCTION
In the last few decades computers, and their
attached networks, have spread throughout the
globe to the stage where they are now pervasive in
our everyday lives. However while these
technological leaps have arguably made our lives
easier and our jobs more efficient they have not
necessarily made our data (of whatever type or
content) more secure. Work, home and government
networks are now all connected through the
internet, leaving them open to attack, whether the
attack’s origin is within the same city as the server
storing the data, or is half a world away on a
different continent.
A Trend Micro [1] survey of 500 corporations,
government agencies, financial institutions,
medical institutions, and universities revealed that
85% of them had suffered a security breach in the
preceding 12 months. Everyone in the networked
world is at risk of those who wish to cause harm to
computer systems.
In an effort to counter these threats network
infrastructure in the form of Firewalls and
Intrusion Detection systems are implemented.
Firewalls act as a perimeter defence around a
network, blocking traffic that is not allowed to
enter (or exit) a network. Intrusion detection
systems are used to alert administrators to threats
that have made it through the firewall onto the
network, often producing an automated response or
action.
Current intrusion detection systems and firewalls
are designed to operate on a single gateway as an
individual location separate to the other
components of the network (or as an individual
listening sensor monitoring network traffic). This
results in them not having access to the contextual
information of what is occurring to the network as
a whole; which frequently involves having other
gateways to other networks and the internet.
The following paper will describe the analysis
processes and results of an examination of an Audit
log that was amalgamated from multiple gateways
across an entire class C IP address range. Attacks
that are being carried out against the network as a
whole will be responded to, pre-empting the
attack’s continuation against other gateways on the
network.
AUDIT LOG ANALYSIS
The most fundamental element in almost any
intrusion detection system is the presence of a log
file. Audit log files record the events that occur on
a computer system, along with a time-stamp and
other identifiers such as the user or IP address.
Without this critical information it is impossible to
know what operations have been performed on the
system. The log files used within this study were
from the gateways (entry points) to a network.
Audit log files have primarily been used in the past
to analyse how an attack occurred upon a system
after it has finished [2]. Clifford Stoll [3] in his
book The Cuckoo’s Egg details how he tracked a
series of attacks by a hacker on and through his
system by printing out his activities and
laboriously manually analysing what the hacker
had done. During the 1980’s audit logs changed
from being massive mounds of weeklong printouts
to being stored electronically on the system.
Developments in pattern matching techniques
allowed for automated analysis of electronically
stored audit logs [4]; these were the first intrusion
detection systems.
During the 1990’s advances in computing power
enabled the analysis of audit logs to occur in real-
time, thus allowing these intrusion detection
systems to respond immediately to attacks [5]. The
events which usually result in a log being created
in most systems entail identification and
authentication mechanisms, creation, deletion or
modification of files and directories, network
activity and administrative activity relating to
processes and account creation [6].
Before analysis can occur the data stored within the
file is filtered, discarding information that is
irrelevant to the analysis. Feature extraction is a
further process of log reduction; it examines the
log file entries, extracting specific relevant
information and again discarding the remainder.
These methods facilitate fast efficient extraction of
audit log data.
There are two main methods by which attacks are
discovered upon a system through Log File
Analysis: Anomaly Detection and Signature
Detection.
Anomaly detection ID systems require a profile of
each user or user group to be made to enable the
system to “learn” what comprises normal
behaviour [7, 8]. The behaviour model is then
compared to user actions upon the system,
searching for behaviour that does not fit the model;
this behaviour is then classed as abnormal
behaviour and treated as an intrusion.
Anomaly detection is broader then just mapping
profiles of human usage. It is also applicable to
processes and network access or usage [9].
Network traffic analysis also yields profiles of
normal usage that can be used in monitoring
network traffic for anomalies and thus to detect
attacks.
Signature detection searches audit logs for known
attacks, matching malicious behaviour to pre-
defined signatures. Signature or misuse detection
has a database of attack signatures against which it
can compare network event patterns in order to
discover an attack. This results in signature
detection systems being able to be operational
directly after they are installed without the need for
any training of the system [8].
Signature based intrusion detection is significantly
more computationally efficient then anomaly based
detection per item of knowledge as it does not need
to create matrices for each system activity [10].
However, Brox [11] comments that signature
detection has a flaw in that it requires a signature
for a given attack to be able to be detected, and in
some instances this is a case of waiting for an
attack to occur, to then be able to make a signature
to protect against it. Existing signature based
intrusion detection systems examine audit logs
within the context of a single gateway, and do not
therefore protect systems from a signature that in
actuality is spread across several gateways. It is
this shortfall that is examined in this paper.
MULTIPLE GATEWAY ANALYSIS
Current Intrusion Detection Systems using
signature or anomaly detection (or indeed
combinations of them both) work effectively upon
a single gateway or network device, however they
lack the context of what is occurring across the
entire network. Network infrastructure need to be
contextually aware to be truly effective and
efficient. An example of this can be seen in early
packet filtering firewalls that lacked the contextual
information of session data, and thus somewhat
needlessly and laboriously filtered each packet
within a session, ignoring the previous conclusion
that the packets were not malicious in content.
Likewise, multiple gateways across a single
network could each be being (trivially) attacked
simultaneously, each largely ignoring the attack,
when in reality the attack is occurring across the
whole network and is of a serious concern.
To be able to efficiently monitor and act upon such
attacks a centralized analysis module needs to
operate, having access to the complete audit logs of
each gateway or sensor upon the network so as to
preserve the network context. The Log
amalgamation allows for signature and anomaly
detection methods to be implemented network
wide, thus allowing for a unified defence across the
multiple gateways of the network.
IMPLEMENTATION
The implementation utilises actual audit data from
a gateway range that consists of multiple remote
gateways along with the central server (ns1). Ns1
is bound to the IP addresses of almost a complete
C-class running from 0 to 252 in the last octet. This
acts as an excellent range of ‘virtual’ consecutive
gateways, as it will appear externally as though
there are 253 separate machines when really each
IP address will report to the same machine.  The
audit log still reports which IP address within this
range was probed, meaning that it is possible to
analyse the data from this single machine as though
it were 253 separate gateway machines (Figure 1).
      
Fig. 1. Audit Log Amalgamation.
The majority of the results discussed within this
paper were gathered from port probes that covered
this IP range. One of the goals of the system is to
develop an effective threshold level of probes
which if passed would result in action being taken
to protect the network as a whole.
The system developed to obtain results consists of
two separate modules – an analysis module and a
tracking module. A database is utilised to store the
processed data.
The analysis module is developed to maintain an
overall image of the state of the system at any
given time. It analyses every incoming log entry, or
an archived log file, and updates a table in the
database which specifies which source IP addresses
may be of interest. Rather than keeping a database
entry for every instance of each IP within the log, it
only makes one entry for each individual IP
address and then increments a count for all
subsequent instances along with additional
Boolean information indicating if an IP has
scanned more then a single gateway, or port.
This count that is recorded, is the value used by a
that the threshold or heuristic that dictates how
long an IP address can probe the network before it
is banned upon all the gateways; this enables the
analysis and tracking module to have a window of
opportunity to gather the required information to
ns1
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assess whether or not an IP is conducting a
multiple gateway attack and set a Boolean multiple
gateway attack value.
The tracking module is developed to follow the
exact activities of individual IP addresses which
have been deemed to be performing suspicious, or
potentially interesting, types of scans across
multiple gateways or port numbers. It creates a
database entry for each piece of activity within the
log file from the IP addresses that it is tracking.
This results in a highly verbose, yet extremely
comprehensive, record of the activities of these
particular IP addresses. This data can then be
analysed to gain an insight into the methods used
for these scans.
The aim of these two modules is to track the
activities of IP addresses across the gateway range
in an attempt to recognise any patterns or methods
of attack that are currently being overlooked by the
existing security infrastructure examining them
each singularly.
RESULTS
The results that have been ascertained fall into two
categories, one for each module, Analysis Results
and Tracking Results.
Analysis Module Results
The analysis module records a set of information
on each IP which probes one of the gateways on
the network; it records the number of times this IP
has probed the network, whether or not it has
probed more then one gateway, what port it probed
on and whether or not it has probed multiple ports.
When examining these data sets the following
simple statistic table can be identified (Table 1).
During the 10-day study period (September 1st till
10th 2003) 6766 individual IP addresses probed the
gateways on the network; of these 776 (11.5% of
Single
Gateway
Multiple
Gateways
Source IP
Addresses 5990 776
% of Total 88.5 11.5
Table 1. Individual IP address Statistics.
the total) probed more then one of the gateways.
This demonstrates that there is a sizeable risk to
systems from malicious users who are approaching
gateway access at a network wide level, thus
justifying central processing of audit data to retain
network context. Realising that the presence and
mode of attack is present, however, is only the first
step to combating the problem itself. Detecting
when these attacks are taking place with reasonable
efficiency is the true goal of the Analysis module.
Upon further examination of the data collected by
the analysis module, it is possible to group the
source IP addresses based on the total number of
probes sent. Fig. 2 (over page) shows that the vast
majority (83%) of source IP addresses sent only 3
or fewer probes against the network, indicating that
perhaps it could be an appropriate level to test a
threshold level heuristic. There are also slight
increases at 6 and 9 also which were tested as
threshold levels. This heuristic was then used in
conjunction with the Boolean value stored for
whether or not an IP has probed more then one
gateway to classify source IP’s, creating a less
coarse heuristic rule set.
 The results showed that at a threshold level of 3
only 3.2% of IP’s were classified as potentially
performing scans on multiple gateways. With the
optimum of 11.5% to get all potential malicious
probes it is a relatively poor result. By comparison,
as the threshold level was increased to the levels of
6 and 9, the result returned were 8.3% and 10%
respectively. These results were much more
acceptable, however not quite at the levels desired
to achieve an acceptable efficiency.
527
919
4195
104 122
359
20 44 72 12
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Number of Probes attempted
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
in
d
iv
id
u
al
 IP
s
Fig. 2. Distribution of the number of port probe attempts
Fig. 3 illustrates the final distribution after
testing several other threshold levels. The
optimum level of efficiency was found to
be when operating an 11 probe threshold.
Tracking Module Results
The tracking module produced very
interesting results by using the flags that
were triggered by the analysis module as a
guide to which source IP addresses were
worth tracking. The graph in Figure 4
depicts the ten days of Tracker activity on
all source IP addresses that probed the
gateway array. More than 40,000 probes
were received in total in order to
statistically analyse the scan activity on the
gateway array as shown in Fig. 4. The scans
across multiple gateways from one or more
source IP addresses appear as vertical bars
within this graph because of the large scale
of the x-axis.
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Fig. 3. Effectiveness of Detecting IP address probing Multiple Gateways
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Fig 4 Ten days of gateway activity recorded by the Tracker Module
These scans are taking place over a time
interval of between one minute and one
hour, and will be referred to as ‘fast’ or
‘normal’ scans. Generally these are
occurring as quickly as the internet
connection and processor speed of the
attacking machine will allow. The diagonal
lines on a 45-degree angle spanning a
number of days are referred to as a ‘slow’
scan. These will have a far larger time
interval between each individual probe of
anywhere up to an hour, making them more
difficult to detect. Using the Tracking
module it is possible to track a single IP
and watch what it has done over a period of
time, Fig. 5 displays the methodicalness of
a port scan across the entire range of the
class C address as well as the fact the scan
also covered multiple ports on each of the
gateways. It is this style of attack that our
implementation is attempting to detect, and
act upon to protect the given network.
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Fig. 5 .Port scan across multiple gateways and ports from a lone source IP address.
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CONTINUING WORK
The implementation has progressed on to
automating the process to allow it to occur
in real-time, while also building in
interaction between the Analysis and
Tracking module. A third module has also
been created called the Action module
which examines the results produced by the
other two and formulates a firewall rule to
be sent to the gateways to provide
protection from a multiple gateway attack.
The goal of the Action module is be a pre-
emptive defence mechanism to provide
protection the gateways on the network that
have not yet been attacked by a given IP
address. For this to be truly worthwhile the
process needs to be efficient and operate at
real-time during attacks.
The current work on the system is also
aiming at discovering the optimum ban
length for attackers to prevent both long-
term slow scans and attackers who return
after a period of inactivity. This optimum
length will be one of the heuristics
considered when creating the firewall rules
in response to a detected attack.
RELATED WORK
There have been continuous developments
and advancements in the examination of
electronic audit logs since the 1980’s.
However this has only rarely branched into
the realm of amalgamating logs across
gateways to examine threats at a network
wide level. Recent research in this area has
occurred however with the MINDS project.
MINDS
The MINDS [12]Minnesota Intrusion
Detection System) project has the objective
of producing a system which will allow
large scale analysis using data mining
algorithms to detect attacks [12]. The
MINDS system uses a combination of
signature detection and anomaly detection
to provide protection to the University of
Minnesota network.
The MINDS system uses network traffic
flow data collected from CISCO routers.
This audit data is then filtered to remove
extraneous entries before feature extraction
collates the required information for
analysis (source and destination IP’s and
ports, protocols, timestamp, flags). Also
catalogued is derived contextual
information such as the amount of traffic to
a destination from a specific source. The
extracted, reduced log is then run through
the Attack Detection Module of MINDS
using signature detection to discover any
known attacks. The remaining log is then
fed through the Anomaly Detection
Modules that allocates a score to each
connection in relation to normal traffic
patterns. Connections that score highly are
then further analysed by the network
administrators to moderate whether or not
the connection was an intrusion or a false
positive. Connections that scored highly by
the Anomaly Module, and are not found to
be false positives by the administrators, are
then further analysed to produce new
signatures for emerging attacks. It is in this
way the MINDS system is able to not only
protect against the more common and well
known attacks, but is also very strong on
the detection of novel attacks, or attacks
which are not yet supported by many other
IDS [13, 14].
The MINDS project has been developed
during the same period as our own system,
and as such, there are some notable
d i f fe rences  be tween  the  two
implementations. The MINDS project does
not employ threshold level heuristics in
their detection mechanisms, and the system
is not fully intended to be automated
process.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this paper has demonstrated
that it is possible to detect and indeed track
malicious scans across a series of gateways
through the centralised analysis of audit
logs. Detecting such attacks is impossible
for individual gateways spread across a
network as they lack the contextual
information to recognise the true aims of a
single trivial probe against a port.
Once the central processing and analysis
has occurred, and detected malicious source
IP addresses it is possible to defend the
remaining network gateways from future
attacks. Such pre-emptive defence
mechanisms will
 better equip network administrators to
protect and maintain services to users
within sizeable networks.
REFERENCES
[1] T. Micro, "The Real Cost of a Virus
Outbreak," Trend Micro, Cupertino
CA, White Paper 2002.
[2] C. P. Pfleeger and S. L. Pfleeger,
Security in computing, 3rd Int ed.
Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice
Hall PTR, 2003.
[3] C. Stoll, The cuckoo's egg : tracking
a spy through the maze of computer
espionage. London: Pan Books,
1991.
[4] J. Anderson, "Computer Security
Threat Monitoring and
Surveillance.," Fort Washington
April 1980 1980.
[5] R. Kemmerer and G. Vigna,
"Intrustion Detection: A Brief
History and Overview," IEEE
Computer, vol. Special publication
on Security and Privacy, 2002.
[6] E. G. Amoroso, Intrusion detection
: an introduction to Internet
surveillance, correlation, traps,
trace back, and response, 1st ed.
Sparta, N.J.: Intrusion.Net Books,
1998.
[7] L. Heberlein, G. Dias, K. Levitt, B.
Mukherjee, J. Wood, and D.
Wolber, "A Network Security
Monitor," Proceedings of the 1990
IEEE Symposium on Research in
Security and Privacy, pp. 296-304,
1990.
[8] G. Holden, Guide to Network
Defence and Countermeasures:
Thomson, 2003.
[9] S. Hofmeyr, S. Forrest, and A.
Somayaji, "Intrusion Detection
using Sequences of System Calls,"
Journal of Computer Security, vol.
6, pp. 151/180, 1998.
[10] S. Kumar, "Classification and
detection of computer intrusions.,"
in Computer Science: Purdue
University, 1995, pp. 180.
[11] A. Brox, "Signature Based or
Anomaly Based Intrusion Detection
– The Practice and Pitfalls,"
Schmagazine, 2002.
[12] R. T. MINDS, "MINDS -
Minnesota Intrusion Detection
System," V. Kumar and J.
Srivastava, Eds., 2004.
[13] L. Ertoz, E. Eilertson, A. Lazarevic,
P. Tan, P. Dokas, J. Srivastava, and
V. Kumar, "Detection and
Summarization of Novel Network
Attacks Using Data Mining,"
Technical Report 2003.
[14] L. Ertoz, E. Eilertson, A. Lazarevic,
P. Tan, J. Srivastava, V. Kumar, and
P. Dokas, "The MINDS - Minnesota
Intrusion Detection System," in
Next Generation Data Mining,
2004.
